Usulischolars consider the well-known objections to be a defeater of a narration’scredibility because they expose an inherent problem within thenarration. In fact, they claim that, in the presence of theseobjections, the greater the narration’s apparent soundness, themore pronounced its weakness becomes. A few scholars, however, donot view these objections as a defeater; by invoking the ruling ofcertain narrations—which maintain that no doubt is permissible inthe reports of the trustworthy transmitters—they have attemptedto nullify the detectability of these objections through what isknown as the argument of obligatory abrogation (a critique advancedby Kabravi). Regardless of the success of this attempt, itdemonstrates that what truly dismembers the persuasive power of thedefeasibility argument is not Kabravi’s critique but rather thedouble indemonstrability of the conditions required for thefulfillment of the minor argument—namely, the conditions of“attention” (التفات) and “non-reliance” (عدم استناد)—whichhave hitherto received insufficient attention. As long as onecannot establish, first, that the jurist indeed pays attention tothe narration (the existential condition) and, second, that herefrains from relying on it (the non-existential condition), theobjection cannot be decisively upheld.The authors of this paper have examined these two conditionsusing a descriptive-analytical method. With respect to“attention,” the refuting and opposing proofs presented by theauthors demonstrate that, under the assumption of non-implementationof the narration, it is much more likely that the jurist does notpay attention to it. As for the condition of “non-reliance,” itconstitutes merely a minor part of an ontological argument and,considering the logical principle of “intrinsic causes” (ذواتالأسباب) as well as the problem of circularity, it isindemonstrable.