Invoking ordinary documents in civil procedure is a critical legal and jurisprudential subject that requires examining the position of attaining judicial knowledge. This study addresses whether a judge can rule based solely on knowledge derived from ordinary documents, without being restricted to official evidence. The hypothesis posits that relying on these documents necessitates fulfilling fundamental conditions of invocation and the non-restrictiveness of judicial knowledge to specific evidence. Imami jurisprudence demonstrates that judicial knowledge, however reasonably and argumentatively attained, is authoritative, even if originated from ordinary documents. Legally, principles like the freedom of evidence and the consensual nature of contracts emphasize the validity of ordinary documents, and restricting them contradicts the discovery of truth. Utilizing a descriptive-analytical method and library research, this article concludes that accepting ordinary documents as a legitimate source of judicial knowledge ensures justice and protects the parties' rights. Ultimately, invoking ordinary documents within this framework constitutes a major pillar in guaranteeing judicial justice.