The existential argument, which uses the subjective concept of God to prove His objective existence, was first proposed by Anselm and has had many supporters and opponents throughout the history of philosophy and theology. One of the most important criticisms of this argument comes from Immanuel Kant, who, by denying that the predicate "existence" is real, questioned the possibility of proving God through this argument.
According to Anselm's view, God is defined as a being greater than whom no one can imagine, and if such a being exists only in the mind, then a being greater than him can be imagined that exists both in the mind and outside; therefore, God must necessarily have an external existence. Kant opposed this argument and believed that "existence" is not a real predicate, but only expresses the realization of a concept. In other words, existence is not a property added to the nature of an object in order to be effective in existential arguments.
In this article, after a careful examination of Kant's criticism, it is shown that this criticism applies to Anselm's argument only if we consider existence to be merely an analytical proposition with no connection to external reality.